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SALES OF STOCK
rights are burdened by the superior rights of the sovereign and may
be taken.4 Yet compensation is required for all substantial tak-
ings save only those interests burdened specifically by the naviga-
tional servitude. 5 It thus may well be that the premise supporting
the no-compensation rule is not on solid footing.
HAROLD R. WEINBERG
LICENSES - SALES OF STOCK - WITHDRAWABLE
CAPITAL SHARES
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
The question of what constitutes a security within the Securities
Exchange Act of 19341 was partially resolved for the first time by
the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Tcherepnin v.
Knight.2 In Tcherepnin, the petitioners, holders of withdrawable
capital shares3 in the City Savings Association of Chicago, sued City
Savings and its officials4 in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois alleging that: (1) the shares were se-
curities within the definition in the Exchange Act;' (2) the shares
were purchased because the petitioners had relied on misleading
solicitations;' (3) and that the misleading solicitations had been
mailed in violation of section 10 (b) of the Exchange Act7 and rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).' The peti-
tioners asked that the sales be declared void under section 29(b)
of the Exchange Act.'
The district court ruled that the shares were securities and de-
nied the respondents' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On
interlocutory appeal,"0 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court and held that the shares were not securi-
ties within section 3(a) (10) of the Exchange Act.1
In reversing the court of appeals the Supreme Court found that
the withdrawable capital shares closely resembled an investment
contract" as construed in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 3 Although the
Howey case had actually interpreted the phrase "investment con-
tract" in section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,14 the Court
found no difficulty in applying the Howey formula"5 to the Ex-
44Id. For a discussion of the rationale see text accompanying notes 1-11 supra.
4 5 See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
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change Act. 6 The Court said that the shares represented an in-
vestment of money in a common enterprise which depended on the
skill of management for success.'"
Finally, the Court said that the court of appeals had misunder-
stood the significance of the absence of the term "evidence of in-
debtedness" which was included in the definition of a security in
the Securities Act' but omitted from that of the Exchange Act. 9
115 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
2389 U.S. 332 (1967).
35Withdrawable capital shares are one of the two means by which an Illinois savings
and loan association may raise capital. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 761 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1967). Each holder of a withdrawable capital share becomes a member of the
association and is entitled to the vote of one share for each $100 of the aggregate with-
drawal value of his account. Id. §5 741(a) (1), 742(d) (2). Holders of the shares
receive dividends only from the profits of the association and may voluntarily withdraw
the capital only under restricted statutory conditions. Id. §§ 778(c), 773. The shares
are not negotiable but may be transferred by assignment and delivery. Id. § 768.
4The officials included the officers and directors of the Association, State officials
who had taken custody of the Association, and three liquidators who had been named
by the shareholder in a voluntary liquidation plan. 389 U.S. at 333.
5Exchange Act § 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1964). The pertinent
part of the definition reads:
The term "security" means any note, stock, . . . bond, debenture, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement ... any collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a secur-
ity, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security" .....
6 The solicitations portrayed City Savings as a financially strong institution but did
not disclose that City Savings was: (1) controlled by a person who had been convicted of
mail fraud in connection with a savings and loan association; (2) refused federal insurance
because of its unsafe financial policies; (3) previously forced to restrict withdrawals on
previously issued shares. 389 U.S. at 334.
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964). The section provides that it is unlawful to use any device
in the purchase or sale of securities which contravenes the rules and regulations of the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).
8 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (1967).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1964). This provision declares that every contract made
in violation of any sections of the Exchange Act and any rules of the SEC shall be void
with regard to the rights of the violator.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1292b (1964).
11 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1967).
12 The investment contract is generally recognized to be a catchall classification for
unusual security arrangements. See I L. Loss, SECURITiEs REGULATION 483 (2d ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss].
13 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
14 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964) [hereinafter cited as Securities Act].
15 See note 25 infra & accompanying text.
16 This is not unusual. See, e.g., SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Fxch.,
285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961).
17 389 U.S. at 338-39.
1815 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
19 Compare id., with, Exchange Act 5 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1964).
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While the omission might be significant in other cases, it is not sig-
nificant in Tcherepnin because the holder of the withdrawable capi-
tal shares can never become a creditor!' Therefore, the certificate
can never be considered evidence of indebtedness'
The two leading cases22 which have construed the definition of
a security under federal legislation are SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp.,' and SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 4 In Joiner, the Court gave
an extremely general test for what constitutes a "security" placing
emphasis on the nature and extent of the risk to the initial invest-
ment.25 In Howey, however, the Court defined "investment con-
tract" as "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person in-
vests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits
solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party ... .'
Thus, the Howey approach to definition of a "security" represents a
shift in emphasis from investment risk to profit expectation, and
since risk is not necessarily a function of profit expectation,28 Howey
operates as a narrowing clarification of the Joiner test.29
Tcherepnin professes to adhere to both the Joiner and Howey
decisions, however, the Court's reasoning indicates that it may have
lost contact with the concept of a security. While there is an indi-
cation"0 that the Court may be reemphasizing the Joiner focus on
20 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 773(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
21 The negative implication of the Court's conclusion is that if the certificate could
be an evidence of indebtedness, it may not be a security under the Exchange Act. For
a discussion of the validity of this implication, see text accompanying note 48 infra.
2 2 Both cases concern arrangements which are characterized by the catchall category
of investment contracts.
23 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
24 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
25 The existence of a security was to be determined by the character of the instrument
in commerce, the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic induce-
ments held out to the prospect. 320 U.S. at 352-53; see Coffey, The Economic Reali-
ties of "Securit";" Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 367, 381
(1967). See also 1 Loss supra note 12, at 481-82.
26 328 U.S. at 298-99 (emphasis added).
2 7 See Coffey, supra note 25, at 381.
2 8 See notes 39-41 infra & accompanying text.
2 9 See Pasquesi, The Expanding "Securities" Concept, 49 ILL. B.J. 728, 730 (1961).
30 The inference is the author's reaction after observing the Court's express adoption
of much of the reasoning of the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals which empha-
sized the risk to initial investment:
If the association is successful, the investors' holdings are worth more than the
price paid. If, as here, the association is unsuccessful, the shares become
worth very little. It is the flucuation in the value of their shares that is im-
portant to the shareholders .... [TJhe use of the federal and-fraud pro-
visions would help to guard against circumstances that would plummet the
19681
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the risk to initial investment,3 the Court is forgetting the Joiner
rule concerning the interpretation of securities legislation32 when it
says that "[ijn addition, we are guided by the familiar canon of
statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed
broadly . . . ."" If this canon is true, it follows that criminal legis-
lation must be strictly construed. Since the Exchange Act provides
criminal penalties for its violation,34 the existence of a security could
depend as much on the type of action as on the statutory require-
ments.35
The Court not only strayed from Joiner's clear principles of
statutory interpretation, but also clouded Howey's concept of profit
inducement. Although the Court seems correct in saying that the
existence of the relationship between investor profits and income
statement profits of the risk enterprise satisfies the Howey formula,"6
it is unnecessary for the Court to imply" that Howey requires such
a relationship." Profits to an investor can be completely separate
and unrelated to the accounting profits of the enterprise.3 9 Fixed
interest payments on a debt obligation," appreciation in the value
share value downwards. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374, 384 (7th Cir.
1967) (dissenting opinion).
31 Some recent federal and State decisions have recognized this risk as an essential
element. In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind.
1966), the court said that "Ithe effect on an investor of an issuer corporation's failure
to disclose . . . [creates] an appreciable risk of loss to that investor .... " Id. at 680.
See also Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961), discussed in Coffey, supra note 25, at 391 nn.106 & 402. See gen-
erally Sobieski, Securities Regulation in California: Recent Developments, 11 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1, 5-7 (1963).
32 Joiner established that the canonized arguments of ejusdein generis and expressio
unius did not aid the interpretation of securities legislation which should be construed
by discovering the purposes of the legislation and interpreting the provisions in light of
those purposes. 320 U.S. at 350. See Coffey, supra note 25, at 405-06.
33 389 U.S. at 336 (emphasis added).
34 15 U.S.C. 9 78ff(a) (1964).
35 The Court's language is so vague and unclear that it is conceivable that lower
courts might treat it as demanding differing tests for determining if a security exists de-
pending on whether the nature of an action is civil or criminal. That this result could
derive from the "legislative intent" seems somewhat ludicrous.
36 389 U.S. at 338-39.
3 7 The length of the Court's discussion and the reemphasis of the relationship make
it appear that the relationship is vital to the existence of a security. Id.
38 Clearly Howey does not require such a relationship. See Coffey, supra note 25,
at 403.
39 Id. at 401-02.
40 This is the usual arrangement on corporate bonds where interest must be paid
whether or not the corporation has earned a profit. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS - AN
INTRODUCroRY ANALYSIS 87 (6th ed. 1964). See also A. FREY, C. MORRIS & J.
CHOPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1256 (1966).
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of a security, and nonpecuniary benefits in excess of the investment4
are as much profits under Howey as dividend distributions from an
enterprise's net income.42 The danger in emphasizing the relation-
ship is that some lower courts may consider it a prerequisite in de-
termining the existence of a security."
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Tcherepnin opinion is
the Court's repeated comparisons of the capital shares with equity
share interests in a risk enterprise.4" The disturbance culminates
with the Court's statement that the omission of evidence of indebt-
edness from the Exchange Act45 is not significant in Tcherepnin be-
cause the shareholders never become creditors of the savings and
loan." The negative implication of this conclusion is that if the
shareholders were creditors, the shares might not have been securi-
ties.4 However, even if the shareholders were creditors, the eco-
nomic realities of a security would be present because buyers, un-
familiar with the operations of the enterprise and induced by a
seller's representations which aroused reasonable expectations of
profits, furnished the seller with investments which were subjected
4 1 An example is the purchase of an entrance privilege to a dub which is acquired
before the club's completion when the value of the entrance privilege (club member-
ship) is less than it will be on the completion of the club facilities. See Coffey, supra
note 25, at 402-03.
42d. at 377-78.
48 If some courts interpret the relationship as a necessary element of a security, in-
vestors might be deprived of the anti-fraud protection of securities legislation. Such a
result would be strange in light of the continuing drive to expand the security concept
for the purposes of the anti-fraud provisions. See generally Pasquesi, supra note 29.
4 4 E.g .... "[pjetitioners' shares can be viewed as certificate[s] of interest or par-
ticipation in [a] profit-sharing agreement [They] must be evidenced by a certificate ....
[D]ividends are contingent upon an apportionment of profits. These... factors make
the shares 'stock' under § 3(a) (10)." 389 U.S. at 339. Later, in discussing the court
of appeals' disposition of the fact that the shareholders were not entitled to inspect the
general books of the association, the Court said, "Inspection of that nature... is not a
right which universally attaches to corporate shares." Id. at 344.
45 The SEC takes the position that the indusion of the phrase in the Securities Act
and the exclusion from the Exchange Act is merely a difference in draftsmanship and
is therefore of little significance. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374, 377 (1967).
See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 78-79 (1959) concerning the binding
effect of administrative interpretations.
46 389 U.S. at 344.
47 Such a result would be absurd in light of the policy of emphasizing economic
reality. See SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946). Moreover, the statu-
tory definition on its face contains many debtor-creditor relationships such as parties to
a note, bond, or debenture transaction. See Exchange Act § 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C. §
78c(a) (10) (1964). Cases under the Securities Act have also held debtor-creditor
relationships to be securities. See, e.g., Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954) (sale of promissory notes); SEC v. Vanco,
Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.NJ. 1958) (sale of renewable promissory notes). See also
cases cited in Coffey, supra note 25, at 385 n.85.
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to the risks of an enterprise in exchange for debt-holders claims.48
Therefore, it is irrelevant that the shares resembled equity interests
and the Court's emphasis on the resemblance is misleading.
It can only be hoped that the implications of Tcherepnin's loose
terminology are not the beginning of a trend toward restricting the
definition of a security to include only instruments which are specif-
ically designated in the statutes or which possess many equity char-
acteristics." Despite the loose language, Tcherepnin did dispel any
doubt concerning the applicability of the fraud sections of securities
legislation" to savings and loan securities5 merely because they are
exempt from registration." It seems possible that the future might
see many savings and loan accounts (whether evidenced by cer-
tificates, shares, or passbooks) regulated, for fraud purposes, under
securities legislation if they meet the risk53 and profit inducement
4 8 See Coffey, supra note 25, at 377.
49 The equity characteristics present in Tcherepnin were voting control, percentage
sharing in profits, and profits to the investor to be paid only from enterprise earnings.
5OSecurities Act §§ 12(2), 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2), 77q(a) (1964); Ex-
change Act § 10(b), 15(c) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 78o(c) (1).
51 It seemed impossible that anyone could think that savings and loans were exempt
from the fraud sections by virtue of the exemption from registration until the Seventh
Circuit decision. See II Loss 798. Even savings and loan executives intended to adhere
to the anti-fraud sections. Morton Bodfish, Executive Manager of the United States
Building and Loan League, said that "we are in accord with [the] section[s] . . . which
would apply to all of our associations if there are any improper or fraudulent or decep-
tive practices." Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 70, 72 (1933). Other league officials held similar
opinions concerning the regulation of savings and loan securities. See Hearings on S.
875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 50, 51
(1933).
5 2 The exemptions are found in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Se-
curities Act § 3(a) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (5) (1964); Exchange Act § 12(g) (2)
(C), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2) (C) (1964). The requirements which must be met in
order to qualify for the exemptions have been the subject of some litigation. See, e.g.,
SEC v. America Int'l Say. & Loan Ass'n, 199 F. Supp. 341 (D. Md. 1961); American
Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962).
53 An argument can be made that savings and loan accounts insured by the United
States Government are subject to little if any risk. Therefore, insured accounts, lacking
the essential risk element, would not be securities. However, to the extent that the
amount deposited exceeds the insurable limit, an account may be considered a security.
The Supreme Court has previously separated seemingly unified instruments and held
that one part is a security and another part is not. See SEC v. United Life Benefit Ins.
Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967), which concerned an annuity plan part of which was the tradi-
tional fixed annuity and part of which was a variable annuity. The former was held
not a security and the latter was held to be a security. See also SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959), which concerns the applicability of securities regula-
tion to variable annuities. Moreover, the Federal Savings and Loan Association Act, 12
U.S.C. § 1464 (a) (1964) emphasizes the investment character of share accounts and
distinguishes them from a debtor-creditor relationship. See Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n
v. Robertson, 294 F.2d 714, 717-18 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (concurring opinion).
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requirements of a security. In addition, other bank savings plans'
(as opposed to savings and loan share accounts) which purport to
be debtor-creditor relationships55 may also be subject to securities
regulation.
If the purpose of securities regulation is really to protect the
uninitiated investor from the abuses of misrepresentation, 6 there is
no policy reason for exempting the securities of banks, savings and
loan associations, and similar institutions from the anti-fraud pro-
visions of securities legislation. Compliance with the provisions
would not involve excessive burdens on the institutions" and would
protect the typical unsophisticated investor who places his savings
in these institutions. In any case, the securities should be exempted
only by legislative fiat and not by a judicial contraction of the defi-
nition of a security.
CHARLES R. SCHAEFER
54 Depending upon one's point of view, a savings and loan share account is either
very similar to or very different from other types of accounts such as commercial bank
savings accounts and mutual bank savings accounts (nonshareholder type). Compare
Prather, Savings Accounts in Savings and Loan Associations, 15 Bus. LAW. 44 (1959),
which emphasizes the similarities, with, Brunner, Status of Mutual Savings Bank Depos-
itors as Contrasted with Savings and Loan Shareholders, 14 BUS. LAw. 1047 (1959),
which emphasizes the differences between the debtor-creditor and shareholder relation-
ships.
55 But the mere fact that there is a debtor-creditor relationship does not remove the
existence of the economic realities of a security. See text accompanying notes 47-49
supra. Savings accounts in national banks may fall into this category. To the extent
they are uninsured, they may also be securities. The relevance of insurance is discussed
in note 53 supra. Moreover, the exemption from registration for national bank secur-
ities under the Securities Act § 3(a) (10), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2) (1964) would be
as unavailable to these institutions as it was to the savings and loan association in Tchere-
pnin.
56 See Note, The Prospects for Rule X-ZOB-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE LJ. 1120, 1120-21 (1950). See also Zatz v. Hertz, Neumark &
Warner, 262 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); White, From the Frying Pan Into
the Fire; Swindlers and the Securities Acts, 45 A.B.AJ. 129, 131 (1959), where the
author discusses the use of the tort concept when a statute designed to protect a particular
class of individuals (apparently the uninitiated investor) is violated.
67 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374, 384 (7th Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
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